Current status: Lawsuit pendingNo settlementNo official refund programNo claim formNo court ruling on liabilityLast verified: September 2, 2026 at 5:53 p.m. PTUpdated Sep 2
Auction mechanics

How Amazon’s Alleged Ad Auction Soft Reserve Worked

The government says Amazon added an undisclosed, Amazon-selected price to Sponsored Ads auctions. Amazon says that account oversimplifies relevance-adjusted auctions and mischaracterizes ordinary reserve pricing.

Last reviewed: September 2, 2026

Start with the simplified second-price idea

In a simplified second-price auction, the winning advertiser does not necessarily pay its maximum bid. It pays approximately the amount needed to beat the next-ranked competitor. Generalized second-price auctions extend that idea across multiple positions and can adjust ranking and price for relevance or quality.

The complaint alleges Amazon had long used simplified explanations saying a winner would pay slightly more than the next-ranked advertiser. Amazon answers that Sponsored Ads placement is not a raw-dollar-bid contest and that older training examples did not fully describe the system. U.S. District Court filing via FTC Amazon

A simplified illustration of the allegation

Illustration—not auction-level evidence

One maximum bid, two possible price paths

Competition-generated result

Advertiser’s maximum bid: $5.00
Competing price: about $2.00

≈ $2.01
Simplified second-price result

Government’s alleged price layer

Amazon-selected soft reserve: $4.25
Advertiser’s maximum bid: $5.00

$4.25
Higher than $2.01, but not above the $5 bid
This example isolates the complaint’s theory; it is not a reconstruction of a particular auction. The complaint does not allege a charge above the advertiser’s own maximum bid. Amazon says relevance affects ranking and pricing and that reserve prices are common in advertising auctions.

What the government alleges happened

Plaintiffs describe a two-stage process: Amazon first calculated a GSP CPC from the ranked auction, then calculated a “soft reserve” or “proxy 2nd price.” The complaint alleges that when the second number was higher, Amazon could use it as the click price, capped by the winning advertiser’s bid. It quotes internal material referring to a price not set by an actual bidder and to an “invented auction participant.” Those quotations appear in a pleading and remain contested. U.S. District Court filing via FTC

The government’s deception theory is not simply that a reserve existed. It alleges Amazon continued fostering an expectation that actual advertiser competition determined the price while using information unavailable to advertisers to set a higher price. Amazon disputes that interpretation of both the auction and its communications.

Why relevance matters to Amazon’s response

Amazon says ads are ranked heavily by predicted relevance, not merely by nominal bids. A competitor’s relevance-adjusted rank can therefore matter more than its raw-dollar bid, and a one-cent-above-the-next-bid example cannot reproduce the real system. Amazon also says Campaign Builder told advertisers a bid was the maximum CPC they could be charged. Amazon

That response creates a distinct factual and legal dispute: whether disclosure of the maximum possible price adequately described how the actual price would be selected. The court has not answered it.

Reserve price does not automatically mean “soft reserve”

A conventional reserve is a minimum price for selling inventory. The government’s challenged term describes an allegedly different Amazon-selected pricing layer that could replace a lower competition-generated result. Amazon rejects the government’s “shill” characterization and treats the mechanism as a legitimate reserve. The labels should not be treated as conclusions.

Three distinct records

Government allegation, Amazon’s answer, and the court record

Government alleges

Amazon used an undisclosed soft reserve to substitute an Amazon-selected CPC for a lower competition-generated result.

Amazon says

The simplified model omits relevance, reserves are common, and advertisers understood that a bid set the maximum possible CPC.

Court has ruled

No merits ruling has established that the pricing or disclosures were unlawful, deceptive, or harmful to any advertiser.

Open record

What we still don’t know

Redactions, missing data, and future court decisions limit what can responsibly be said today.

  • Exact ordinary-day soft-reserve uplift limits in redacted passages
  • Exact Prime Day and Black Friday surcharge ceilings
  • Several internal revenue projections and experiment treatment levels
  • The exact ROAS values and underlying redacted chart data
  • Complete underlying auction-level data and counterfactual methodology
  • Precise product-specific restitution periods, if any
  • Whether any recovery process will exist and who would be eligible
  • A complete authenticated history of Amazon Advertising Agreement arbitration terms